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CObjectives: To assess how diagnosis-related group–based (DRG-based)
hospital payment systems in 12 European countries participating in
the EuroDRG project pay and incorporate technological innovation.
Methods: A standardized questionnaire was used to guide compre-
hensive DRG system descriptions. Researchers from each country re-
viewed relevant materials to complete the questionnaire and drafted
standardized country reports. Two characteristics of DRG-based hos-
pital payment systems were identified as particularly important: the
existence of short-term payment instruments encouraging technolog-
ical innovation in different countries, and the characteristics of long-
term updating mechanisms that assure technological innovation is ul-
timately incorporated into DRG-based hospital payment systems.
Results: Short-term payment instruments and long-term updating
mechanisms differ greatly among the 12 European countries included
in this study. Some countries operate generous short-term payment
instruments that provide additional payments to hospitals for making O
o
n
ellow
in, G
al So
oi:10.1016/j.jval.2011.07.001se of technological innovation (e.g., France). Other countries update
heir DRG-based hospital payment systems very frequently and use
ore recent data for updates. Conclusions: Generous short-term pay-
ent instruments to promote technological innovation should be ap-
lied carefully as they may imply rapidly increasing health-care expen-
itures. In general, they should be granted only if rigorous analyses
ave demonstrated their benefits. If the evidence remains uncertain,
overage with evidence development frameworks or frequent updates
f the DRG-based hospital systems may provide policy alternatives.
nce the data and evidence base is substantially improved, future re-
earch should empirically investigate how different policy arrange-
ents affect the adoption and use of technological innovation and
ealth-care expenditures.
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Technological innovation in health care is highly valued by pa-
tients, doctors, and politicians [1] because advances in medical
technology have greatly improved the ability to prevent, diagnose,
and treat a large number of diseases and conditions reducing mor-
tality and increasing the quality of life [2–5]. At the same time,
technological innovation – which may be defined as “a drug, de-
vice, procedure or organizational support system that is perceived
as new by a proportion of key stakeholders in a health care orga-
nization” [6] – is a major driver of increasing health-care costs [7,8],
nd policies have been devised with the aim of balancing techno-
ogical innovation and affordability [9].
The hospital payment system is one important factor influenc-
ng the adoption and use of technological innovation in health
are [10–13], especially so because many new technologies are first
sed in the inpatient sector. Nevertheless, there have been con-
erns that diagnosis-related group–based (DRG-based) hospital
ayment systems, which are the principal means of hospital pay-
ent in the majority of the Organisation for Economic Co-opera-
ion and Development countries [14], may not provide the right set
* Address correspondence to: David Scheller-Kreinsen, Research F
echnology, Germany, Strasse des 17. Juni 135 (H80), D-10623 Berl
E-mail: David.Scheller-Kreinsen@tu-berlin.de.
098-3015/$36.00 – see front matter Copyright © 2011, Internation
ublished by Elsevier Inc.f incentives to encourage the desired adoption and use of tech-
ological innovation [15–17].
The basic idea of DRG-based hospital payment systems is that
all patients treated by a hospital are classified into a limited num-
ber of DRGs, which are supposed to be clinically meaningful and
relatively homogenous in their resource consumption patterns
[18]. Each DRG is associated with a specific cost weight or tariff,
which is usually calculated from information about average treat-
ment costs of patients falling within a specific DRG in at least a
sample of other hospitals in the past. Depending on the country,
hospitals under DRG-based hospital payment systems either re-
ceive a DRG-based case payment or a DRG-based budget alloca-
tion. In both variants, however, hospitals are exposed to the finan-
cial risk of having costs above the payment rate and are rewarded
for keeping costs below.
There is general consensus in the literature on two basic incen-
tives of DRG-based hospital payment systems: hospitals are en-
couraged to reduce costs per admission, and/or to increase the
number of admissions [19]. Concerning the effects of DRG-based
hospital payment systems on technological innovations, most
studies assume that they incentivize the adoption and use of those
technological innovations, which lead to reduced costs per admis-
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1167V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 4 ( 2 0 1 1 ) 1 1 6 6 – 1 1 7 2sion and do not negatively affect quality of care [20,21]. When
technological innovations are associated with increased costs per
admission, however, disincentives exist for hospitals to adopt and
use them until the DRG-based payment system is updated to ac-
count for their additional costs [9]. Consequently, most countries
with DRG-based hospital payment systems have developed mech-
anisms to account for technological innovation in health care
[9,16,22,23] in order to avoid compromising patient access to qual-
ity-increasing but cost-increasing technological innovations
[17,20,24].
Prior studies have reported that the specific characteristics of
DRG-based payment systems influence the effect these systems
have on technological innovation [13,24]. The specific characteris-
tics of DRG-based hospital payment systems in different countries
and their implications for innovative technologies, however, have
rarely been explored, especially in the European context. Most
studies on DRG-based hospital payment systems and technologi-
cal innovation stem from the United States [25,26–31], and most
international comparative work on the patterns and determinants
of the diffusion of technological innovation does not account for
the differences that exist between different DRG-based hospital
payment systems [32–35].
This study aims to describe specific characteristics of DRG-
based hospital payment systems in 12 European countries (Aus-
tria, England, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, The
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain/Catalonia, and Sweden)
and their implications for technological innovation. More spe-
cifically, the study identifies characteristics of DRG-based hos-
pital payment systems that are relevant for the adoption and
use of technological innovation; presents specific payment in-
struments that are used in the context of DRG-based hospital
payment systems in order to encourage adoption and use of
technological innovation; and describes updating mechanisms
of DRG-based hospital payment systems, which assures that
technological innovation is ultimately incorporated into these
systems. Furthermore, the discussion section provides addi-
tional insights by reviewing the experience in three particular
policy contexts (i.e., France, The Netherlands, and Finland).
Our results were generated in the framework of the EuroDRG
project “Diagnosis-Related Groups in Europe: Towards Efficiency and
Quality” (funded under the seventh framework programme of the
European Commission; www.eurodrg.eu), which compares DRG-
based hospital payment systems in 12 European countries. The proj-
ect scrutinizes the characteristics of DRG-based hospital payment
systems and empirically investigates their capacity to reimburse
hospitals fairly for selected episodes of care.
Methods
Sources of information
Building on the experience of the HealthBasket project [36], re-
earchers from 12 European countries participating in the Euro-
RG project (Austria, England, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
reland, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain/Catalonia, and
weden) developed a standardized questionnaire to guide com-
rehensive DRG system descriptions for each country. One section
f the questionnaire focused specifically on how each country’s
RG-based hospital payment system deals with technological in-
ovations.
After pilot testing applicability of the questionnaire in three
ountries (The Netherlands, Poland, and Spain/Catalonia) in early
009, an updated version was agreed upon in mid-2009. Subse-
uently, EuroDRG project partners reviewed laws, regulations, sci-
ntific and grey literature, and drafted standardized country re-
orts. Country reports were presented and discussed in a
orkshop of the EuroDRG project in early 2010, and extensivelyreviewed and commented on by national experts. Revised ver-
sions of the country reports were finalized in mid-2010.
Each country report contains information on the following as-
pects of DRG systems and their use for hospital payment: an over-
view to the development and use of DRGs for hospital payment in
the country; a description of methods and regularity for updating
the DRG-based hospital payment system; a detailed assessment of
how patients are classified by the DRG systems; an overview of
cost accounting within hospitals; and a summary of reimburse-
ment mechanisms and regulations concerning technological in-
novation. In the summary section authors were asked to describe
the following points: a) formal steps required for the adoption and
use of technological innovation in hospitals; b) instruments and
mechanisms for funding and reimbursement; and c) national ex-
perience with regard to the incentives (or disincentives) resulting
from the reimbursement arrangements.
Analysis
All country reports were reviewed by two researchers (D.S.K.,
W.Q.) to identify characteristics of DRG-based hospital payment sys-
tems that are relevant for adoption and use of technological innova-
tion. Two characteristics were identified as particularly important.
On the one hand, when cost-increasing technological innovation
first enters the market, the short-term availability of additional pay-
ments to cover the additional costs was seen as an important incen-
tive stimulating adoption and use of technological innovation by
hospitals in a number of countries. Therefore, the distribution of dif-
ferent types of short-term payment instruments, which operate out-
side or at the margin of DRG-based hospital payment systems, was
assessed among the 12 countries included in this study.
On the other hand, technological innovation has to be eventu-
ally incorporated into DRG-based hospital payment systems
through long-term updating mechanisms. The ability of DRG-
based hospital payment systems to respond to technological in-
novation through long-term updating mechanisms is determined
by two factors: 1) the frequency of updates, and 2) the time lag
between the collection of (meaningful) cost and medical data and
using this information for hospital payment. Therefore, the long-
term updating mechanisms were assessed among the 12 countries
included in this study. Information was extracted from the coun-
try reports, summarized in overview tables, and verified by Euro-
DRG partners from each country.
Results
Overview
Figure 1 illustrates short-term payment instruments and long-
term updating mechanisms used in DRG-based hospital payment
systems in Europe. On the left-hand side, the figure has short-term
payment instruments used by different countries to encourage the
use of cost-increasing technological innovations at a time when
the DRG-based hospital payment systems do not yet account for
technological innovation. These instruments can be completely
outside the system (extreme left) or can be associated to the DRG-
based hospital payment system (in the middle). On the right-hand
side, the figure presents long-term updating mechanisms to incor-
porate technological innovation formally into the systems, either
by updating the DRG system (i.e., the patient classification system
or PCS), or by adjusting the payment rate.
Short-term instruments
Types of short-term payment instruments
Table 1 lists the three main short-term payment instruments used
by different countries aiming to incentivize hospitals to adopt and
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payments; and special funding for cost outliers. In addition, the
table provides an overview to the main variants of each payment
instrument.
Separate payments, which are the most important instrument
operating outside the general DRG system, can take two forms:
fee-for-service (FFS), negotiated nationally or locally – as for exam-
ple in Germany [24] – or retrospective reimbursement of hospital
reported total costs (e.g., used by some county councils in Swe-
den). Both payment instruments are usually used at a time when
information about costs and effects of technological innovation is
still relatively scarce. Separate payments do not necessarily re-
quire that procedure codes have been assigned. Consequently,
they can be made available very rapidly and provide a high degree
of flexibility with regard to the conditions under which payments
are granted.
In contrast to separate payments, supplementary payments
and cost-outlier funding are relevant for technological innovation
but are also used in order to improve the general DRG system
coherence by excluding certain high-cost technologies or high-
cost patients and reimbursing them separately. Both instruments
take a specific DRG payment rate as a starting point and justify
additional payments in terms of substantial differences between
incurred costs and standard payment rates.
Supplementary payments are paid on top of the “standard”
DRG payment rate if specific technologies (including new and in-
novative ones) are applied. The amount to be paid on top of the
standard rate can be negotiated or can take the form of retrospec-
tive reimbursement of reported costs (per case) above the stan-
dard rate of individual providers. In some countries costs are
weighted across providers before payment is made. For example, the
average costs per patient category are calculated and reimbursed
(“payment of weighted costs”). The necessary administrative pro-
cesses for establishing a relationship between a technological inno-
vation and a DRG require some time, which may contribute to retard-
ing the adoption by hospitals. In some cases, a procedure code needs
to be assigned to a technological innovation before supplementary
payments can take place, thus prolonging the process of providing
reimbursement for technological innovation.
In countries where special funding for cost outliers is available,
the way technologies (including new and innovative ones) influ-
ence homogeneity of resource use of cases within DRGs deter-
mines whether special funding is made available on top of stan-
Fig. 1 – Short-term payment instruments and long-term
updating mechanisms to encourage and incorporate
technological innovation in DRG-based hospital payment
systems. DRG, diagnosis-related group.dard payment rates. Cost-outlier funding builds on detailedretrospective statistical analysis of cost data. Different variants of
this instrument exist (see Table 1). In addition, many countries
provide extra payments for length-of-stay (LOS) outliers for tech-
nological innovation. However, the relevance of these instru-
ments is not clear because technological innovation can increase
LOS when increasing survival of patients, but may also decrease
LOS, e.g. when new, minimally invasive surgical procedures lead
to faster patient recovery and discharge [37].
Distribution of short-term payment instruments in countries
Table 2 presents the distribution of the outlined short-term pay-
ment instruments in the 12 countries included in this study. Sep-
arate payments are the most frequently used payment instru-
ment. Supplementary payments are also used in many countries.
Surprisingly, cost-outlier funding for cost-increasing technologi-
cal innovation is used only in Estonia, Finland, and some Swedish
county councils. In many other countries, outliers are identified
only via LOS because standardized cost data is not available on the
patient level for all hospitals. Some countries (i.e., Austria and
Portugal) do not make use of any short-term payment instru-
ments.
Long-term updating mechanisms in European DRG-based
hospital payment systems
Types of system updates and relationship to data
Updates of the PCS or the payment rate are not exclusively tar-
geted at incorporating technological innovation into DRG-based
hospital payment systems but are supposed to assure that the
systems are always adapted to current practice patterns and treat-
ment costs. Because data are required to make the updates, it is
inevitable that DRG-based hospital payment systems exhibit a
certain time-lag to current practice patterns and treatment costs.
When technological innovation increases (or decrease) treat-
ment costs for a well-defined subset of patients falling into one or
more DRGs, adjusting the DRG system (i.e., PCS) is the best way to
incorporate technological innovation into the DRG-based hospital
payment system. Several options such as reassigning patients to
different DRGs splitting an existing DRG, and creating new DRGs
can be introduced when adjustments are necessary (see Figure 1).
When technological innovation increases the costs of all ser-
vices bundled in one DRG or of all hospital services, updates to
the payment rate are the best approach to incorporate them
Table 1 – Instruments to encourage use of technological
innovation and types of associated payments.
Instrument Type of payment
Outside DRG system
Separate payments ● Fee-for-service (based on weighted
costs or negotiated payment)
● Retrospective reimbursement of
reported costs per case
Inside DRG system
Supplementary
payments
● Fee-for-service
● Retrospective reimbursement of
costs above standard rate
● Payment of weighted costs
Special funding for
cost outliers
● Retrospective reimbursement of
costs above a statistically
determined threshold
● Fixed payments (based on weighted
costs or negotiated payment)
● Payment of weighted costsDRG, diagnosis-related group.
ation
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crease payment for a specific DRG, its cost weight or payment
rate can be recalculated. In order to increase funding for all
hospital services, countries not operating a cost weight ap-
proach can inflate payment rates by the appropriate amount.
Countries using a cost weight approach have two options. They
can either adjust the base rate to account for proportionate
increases of costs (e.g., a 5% increase of all hospital costs) or
they can adjust the base rate and recalculate cost weights if
technological innovations increase costs for all cases by a fixed
amount.
Table 2 – The distribution of short-term payment instrume
Instruments used to p
Separate payments
Austria No
England Yes (for up to 3 years)
Estonia Yes (for certain high-cost services)
Finland No
France Yes
Germany Yes
Ireland Yes
The Netherlands Yes (for certain high-cost drugs)
Poland No
Portugal No
Spain* (Catalonia) Yes (for certain high-cost procedures)
Sweden Depends
* In Spain, hospital financing is decentralized. The presented inform
Table 3 – Frequency of DRG system updates and time-lag t
DRG-ba
Patient classification system
Frequency of
updates
Time lag to data
Austria Annual 2–4 years
England Annual Minor revisions annua
irregular overhauls
every 5–6 years
Estonia Irregular (first update
after 7 years)
1–2 years
Finland Annual 1 year
France Annual 1 year
Germany Annual 2 years
Ireland Every 4 years, linked
to Australian
updates of AR-
DRGs*
Not applicable (import
AR-DRGs)
The Netherlands Irregular Not standardized
Poland Irregular – planned
twice per year
1 year
Portugal Irregular Not applicable (import
AP-DRGs)
Spain (Catalonia) Biennial Not applicable (import
3 year old CMS-DRGs
Sweden Annual 1–2 years
AR-DRGs, All patient (AP-)DRGs; CMS-DRGs, Centers for Medicar
fee-for-service.Frequency and time-lag of system updates
Table 3 presents the frequency of updates and the time-lag to data
used for updates in 12 countries across Europe. The PCS and the
payment rate are updated annually in the majority of countries, but
there are remarkable exceptions. In 2010, Estonia updated its DRG
system for the first time since the introduction of NordDRGs to the
country in 2003. Ireland currently uses Australian DRGs, which are
updated every 4 years. Austria is an interesting outlier with regard to
the adjustment of payment rates because DRG scores are not up-
dated regularly, but are adjusted only for specific DRGs when deemed
necessary by policymakers. The data used for updates varies consid-
in 12 European countries.
e extra payments for technological innovations
Supplementary payments Cost-outlier
funding
No No
Yes (for certain high-cost services) No
No Yes
No Yes
Yes No
Yes (for certain high-cost services) No
No No
Yes (envisaged to start in 2011) No
Yes (for certain high-cost services) No
No No
No No
unty council, all instruments are used
refers to Catalonia.
ta used for updates in 12 European countries.
ospital payment system
Payment rate
Frequency of updates Time lag to data
4–5 years (updated when necessary) 2–4 years
Annual 3 years (but adjusted
for inflation)
Annual or following update of FFS fees 1–2 years
Annual 0-1 year
Annual 2 years
Annual 2 years
Annual - linked to Australian cost weight
updates
1–2 years
Annual or when considered necessary 2 years, or based on
negotiations
Annual update only of base rate 1 year
Irregular 2–3 years
Annual 2–3 years
Annual 2 years
d Medicaid Services DRGs; DRGs, diagnosis-related groups; FFS,nts
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1170 V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 4 ( 2 0 1 1 ) 1 1 6 6 – 1 1 7 2erably between countries. In Finland, data is used from the current
year to update the DRG system for the next year and cost weights are
recalculated as soon as data become available (during the same year).
In most countries data for updating the PCS and adjusting cost
weights or prices are 2 years old or more.
Discussion
This study has demonstrated that European DRG-based hospital
payment systems are characterized by substantial differences in
how they deal with technological innovation. Most, but not all,
countries included in this study have complemented their DRG-
based hospital payment systems with specific short-term pay-
ment instruments targeted at encouraging the adoption and use of
technological innovations. Although all countries update their
DRG-based hospital payment systems, the frequency of updates
and the time lag to the data used for updates differ greatly.
The current study has important methodologic limitations. We
did not empirically investigate the effect different characteristics of
DRG-based hospital payment systems have on the adoption and use
of technological innovations. Consequently, this study cannot de-
duct which characteristics of DRG-based hospital payment systems
are better at encouraging adoption and use of technological innova-
tions. Furthermore, because this study did not look at any specific
technological innovations, it cannot draw conclusions about
whether certain characteristics of DRG-based hospital payment sys-
tems are better at encouraging those cost-increasing technological
innovations that are worth the additional expenditures. Neverthe-
less, in the next subsection, we qualitatively explore the disadvan-
tages and advantages of different policy components for three coun-
try case studies (France, The Netherlands, and Finland). We found
some of the likely effects of short-term payment instruments and
long-term updating mechanisms on technological innovation, and
highlight the results of possibly linking short-term payment instru-
ments to the conditionality of continuing evaluation.
In addition, this study is also limited by the fact that it has focused
on a small set of characteristics of DRG-based hospital payment sys-
tems even though other characteristics are likely to be important as
well. For example, the ownership status of hospitals and whether or
not hospitals are allowed to run deficits will modify the incentives
related to DRG-based hospital payment systems. Furthermore, the
strength of the incentives is determined by the percentage of total
hospital revenue earned through DRG-based payments. If other
sources of funding (e.g., budgets for capital investments, teaching,
and research; or budget adjustments for structural characteristics)
account for an important percentage of total hospital revenues (as in
France, Germany, or Spain), the incentives for technological innova-
tion related to these funding sources need to be considered. The
availability of funding for capital investments can be important for
adoption and use of technological innovation in large scale medical
equipment. We include some information about the availability of
additional funding for capital investments, which is provided in Ap-
pendix Table A1 found at: doi:10.1016/j.jval.2011.07.001, but a de-
tailed discussion of the implications of all sources of revenue would
go beyond the scope of this study.
Short-term payment instruments
Financial implications and experiences from France and
The Netherlands
In general, short-term payment instruments provide strong incen-
tives for hospitals to use technological innovations because they
exempt the selected technologies from the incentives of DRG-
based hospital payment [16]. Consequently, short-term payment
instruments can be expected to be effective at encouraging adop-
tion and use of the selected technologies, but they may also distort pclinical decision making and can lead to inefficiencies related to
overprovision of these services and to increasing health-care ex-
penditures.
In France access to technological innovation is a major public
concern [38] and a generous set of short-term instruments has
been developed. Separate payments are available from a national
budget called MERRI (missions d’enseignement, de reference et
d’innovation) and can cover costs related to the development of
new therapies, drugs, or devices or to fund the use of specific
innovative technologies on an experimental basis. In addition,
supplementary payments are paid over and above regular DRG-
based case payments for technological innovations if these have
been declared part of a national list of supplementary payments
by ministerial order or by the National Union of Health Insurance
Funds [39].
To the authors knowledge no research has yet been conducted
on the specific effect of these arrangements in promoting partic-
ular technological innovations. Some evidence is available about
the development of expenditure over time: expenditures for sep-
arate payments and supplementary payments have been increas-
ing rapidly. Total expenditures for supplementary payments in-
creased by 37% between 2005 and 2007 and reached €2.4 billion
(Euros) in 2008, accounting for roughly 6% of total hospital reve-
nues [39] and for about 58% of pharmaceutical expenditures in
university hospitals [40]. One reason for the strong increase in
expenditures is that the criteria by which technological innova-
tions are assessed prior to inclusion on the “liste en sus” are rela-
tively vague and easy to manipulate. The criteria are: high costs;
substantial effect on the homogeneity of the DRG system; and
innovative character. The criterion of “costliness” is assessed
based on information provided by manufacturers and technolo-
gies qualify for the “liste en sus” the more costly they appear to be.
The criterion “innovativeness” is only vaguely defined and does
not allow rule-based deduction of reimbursement decisions. In an
attempt to control expenditures, volume targets for treatments on
the “liste en sus” were defined at the level of individual hospitals
in 2009, but their impact has been limited so far.
In summary, the French system seems to assure that access to
technological innovations (particularly in cancer treatment) re-
mains one of the most generous in Europe [38], but this comes at
he cost of a considerable share of total hospital expenditures be-
ng spent on separate and supplementary payments [41]. Unfortu-
ately, we are unable to determine whether current spending lev-
ls reflect strong country-specific priorities for encouraging
echnological innovation or whether they indicate overprovision
f services for which the evidence base remains limited. It is clear,
owever, that robust evidence on cost-effectiveness of technolog-
cal innovations is not a prerequisite for reimbursement from
ERRI or through supplementary payments.
Of course, the evidence based on (long-term) effects of techno-
ogical innovations can be limited at the time when decisions have
o be made about the introduction of short-term payment instru-
ents. If countries are concerned about ensuring access to tech-
ological innovations with expected significant quality improve-
ents, but for which the evidence remains uncertain, it would be
eneficial to use short-term payment instruments within a cover-
ge with evidence development (CED) framework [42]. Under CED
pproaches, payments for technological innovations are provided
nly for a limited period of time and under the conditionality of
ontinuing evaluation. The Netherlands provide an example for
eparate payments for innovative or orphan drugs within a CED
pproach [43]. Since 2006, hospitals can receive separate pay-
ents for innovative or orphan drugs under the condition that a
lan exists for the assessment of cost-effectiveness of the drug in
outine clinical practice. After 3 years, the data generated in the
ontext of the assessment plan is used to inform decisions about
roviding further funding for the innovative (or orphan) drug.
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The exception of Finland
In general, DRG-based hospital payment systems are thought to
encourage the efficient use of resources by leaving treatment de-
cisions to providers and making them residual claimants over any
cost savings they implement [44,45]. Given that most DRG-based
hospital payment systems are updated at regular intervals, the
change of treatment patterns and costs resulting from the intro-
duction of technological innovations should eventually be re-
flected by the DRG-based hospital payment system. Consequently,
separate payments and supplementary payments can be discon-
tinued, which increases the incentives for providers to make effi-
cient use of resources.
Countries with frequent updates of their DRG system and pay-
ment rate, and those with a short time-lag between data collection
and using the information for DRG-based hospital payment are in
a better position for incorporating technological innovations into
their systems. Nevertheless, incentives resulting from modifica-
tion of the patient classification system need to be closely monitored.
f a new DRG is introduced (e.g., for using a specific innovative med-
cal device in a broadly defined group of patients) providers could be
ncentivized to overprovide the technological innovation [15].
As illustrated in Table 3, the DRG-based payment system in
inland is updated more frequently than in any other European
ountry included in this study. Both the patient classification sys-
em and the cost weights are updated annually and the time-lag to
he data informing these updates is only 6 months to 1 year. At the
ame time, Finland does not use separate payments or supple-
entary payments to encourage technological innovation. Fin-
and, however, has a system of cost-outlier payment, which as-
ures that cases with exceptionally high costs are reimbursed
eparately. In addition, the strong role of municipalities as both
urchasers and providers of health care could play an important
ole in finding a balance between ensuring access to technological
nnovation and keeping expenditures under control [46]. Regretta-
ly, there was no empirical evidence found about the combined
ffect of the Finnish approach to encouraging and incorporating
echnological innovation within its DRG-based hospital payment
ystem. Nevertheless, it represents an interesting reference case
nd its relative merits in ensuring the integration of technological
nnovations into the DRG-based hospital payments system, and
ccess and diffusion of technological innovations in the inpatient
ector are interesting topics for further investigation.
Conclusions
A common challenge for policymakers when devising payment
policies is to find the right balance between two conflicting goals
[9]. On the one hand, there is a need to provide sufficient incen-
tives for hospitals to make use of quality-increasing but cost-in-
creasing technological innovations in order to ensure patient ac-
cess. On the other hand, there is a need to keep expenditures for
technological innovations under control. This study has shown
that most, but not all, of the 12 included countries have comple-
mented their DRG-based hospital payment systems with specific
short-term payment instruments targeted at encouraging the
adoption and use of technological innovations.
However, the discussion of experiences in France demon-
strates that short-term payment instruments may lead to a strong
increase in expenditures for the selected technologies. Further-
more, because short-term payment instruments are often intro-
duced for technological innovations at a time when rigorous anal-
yses of their (long-term) effects are not yet available, there is a risk
that the additional payments inadvertently incentivize the use of
cost-increasing technological innovations that do not necessarilyimprove quality of care. Therefore, short-term payment instru-
ments should be used very carefully, and granted only after care-
ful assessments of the likely effects of the concerned technology
on quality of care. In several European countries (e.g., France), the
introduction of short-term payment instruments for technological
innovations is currently more directly linked to the criteria of
higher costs than to evidence on medical benefits. If countries
want to provide additional payments for technological innova-
tions for which the evidence remains uncertain, using short-term
payments in the context of a CED approach similar to that used in
The Netherlands appears to be beneficial.
The comparative assessment of long-term updating mecha-
nisms for incorporating technological innovation into DRG-based
hospital payment systems has shown considerable differences
across countries. Some countries seem to be less concerned than
others about keeping their DRG-based hospital payment system
up-to-date. Furthermore, the example of Finland illustrates that it
is possible to update both the PCS and the payment rate frequently
and on the basis of very recent information, possibly even as a
substitute for the extensive use of short-term payment instru-
ments.
Short-term payment instruments and long-term updating
mechanisms differ greatly among the 12 European countries in-
cluded in this study. Future research should empirically investi-
gate how these differences affect the adoption and use of techno-
logical innovation and health care expenditures. A precondition is
that national data on expenditures and on the use of technological
innovation in the framework of short-term payment instruments
are made publicly available. Furthermore, future studies should
scrutinize how specific technological innovations have diffused in
countries since the introduction of DRG-based hospital pay-
ment systems in the early 2000s; and how these relate to the
identified differences in characteristics of DRG-based hospital
payment systems.
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